Abstract-Network coding is emerging as a promising alternative to traditional content distribution approaches in P2P networks. By allowing information mixture and randomized block selection, it simplifies the block scheduling problem, resulting in more efficient data delivery. Existing protocols have validated such advantages assuming altruistic and obedient peers. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework that characterizes a coding-based P2P content distribution market where rational agents seek for individual payoff maximization. Unlike existing game theoretical models, we focus on a decentralized resale market-through virtual monetary exchanges, agents buy the coded blocks from others and resell their possessions to those in need. We model such transactions as decentralized strategic bargaining games, and derive the equilibrium prices between arbitrary pairs of agents when the market enters the steady state. We further characterize the relations between coding complexity and market properties including agents' entry price and expected payoff, thus providing guidelines for strategic operations in a real P2P market. Our analysis reveals that the major power of network coding lies in maintaining stability of the market with impatient agents, and incentivizing agents with lower price and higher payoff, at the cost of reasonable coding complexity. Since the traditional P2P content distribution approach is a special case of network coding, our model can be generalized to analyze the equilibrium strategies of rational agents in decentralized resale markets.
INTRODUCTION
P 2P content distribution systems are built atop the basic premise of voluntary resource contribution by participating peers. Two critical problems are inherent in this presumption: the scheduling decision of individual peers (i.e., choosing which data blocks to share) and the incentives for sharing.
Existing P2P content distribution systems tackled the scheduling problem using random or rarest-first strategies [1] . Such heuristic local algorithms tend to result in suboptimal uploading or downloading decisions that waste network resources [2] . Network coding circumvents the scheduling problem by allowing each peer to encode and deliver a random linear combination of the data on hand. As long as one block is fresh, the entire encoded block is useful to the requester with high probability. Therefore, the risk of uploading duplicate information can be significantly reduced without sophisticated scheduling. Existing protocols (e.g., Avalanche [2] ) have identified network codingbased content distribution as a workable idea, but without rigorous theoretical quantification of its advantages. They have also assumed altruistic resource sharing among peers, which is inconsistent with the greedy and rational behavior that dominates real-world P2P systems [3] .
In this paper, we analyze the performance of network coding-based P2P content distribution protocols from an economic and game theoretic perspective. We envision the P2P content distribution network as a decentralized resale market. Each peer acts as a market agent, namely, a seller and buyer. Before entering the market, a peer must pay an initial service fee (referred to as entry price) that is used to obtain at least one block. Afterward, he can resell the blocks he already possesses and purchase additional blocks with the money in hand. Whenever a seller and a buyer meet, they bargain over the blocks of interest for a consensus price. Both sides of the bargaining game take into account the availability of alternative sellers and buyers, and the potential resale value of the good once the transaction succeeds. Such a model resembles an exchange economy for digital information goods, and sheds lights on the deployment and evolution of practical P2P markets.
We classify peers in the market according to their possessions, i.e., the availability of blocks on them. By modeling the transactions between peers as noncooperative games, we derive the equilibrium pricing strategies for different types of peers. We find that unlike traditional centrally managed market economy, no uniform price exists under strategic bargaining. Instead, the price depends on not only the availability of the goods, but also the valuation of each type of peer on each good. Furthermore, we extend the game to a market scale, and characterize a market equilibrium in which individual peers adopt stationary strategies, and no one has the incentive to deviate over time. We then approximate the evolution of such a market using a system of differential equations, and derive the availability of goods when the market enters steady state.
The above theoretical framework results in closed-form equations that quantify the impact of various design parameters on the stable operations of the market. Through these equations, we observe that the fundamental advantage of network coding lies in maintaining the availability of data blocks even when peers are highly impatient and even in the absence of content servers. Translated into market terms, coding-based protocols induce a higher level of competition among content sellers, thereby avoiding the monopoly or oligopoly scenarios in which a limited number of content holders force up the price. Furthermore, network coding incentivizes the peers by increasing their expected payoff, and reasonable coding complexity is sufficient to harvest such an advantage. Unfortunately, we also find that network coding is against the interests of content servers as their profit decreases with increasing coding complexity.
In summary, our main contributions of this work include:
. A decentralized resale market model for P2P content distribution systems. . A game theoretical framework for analyzing the equilibrium price and goods availability in a network coding-based P2P network. . Characterization of the fundamental advantage of network coding in P2P content distribution systems with rational (payoff-maximizing) peers.
RELATED WORK
Since the pioneering work by Ho et al. [4] , randomized network coding has received substantial attention from P2P protocol designers. The Avalanche [2] system implemented a primitive form of random linear code that encodes all data blocks in a file. More recent protocols have adopted segment-based network coding [5] , which splits the file into multiple segments, each allowing for efficient encoding and decoding. This approach has been applied to file sharing, as well as P2P streaming systems. Despite its wide applications, the fundamental benefits of network coding in such systems have not been fully explored with theoretical rigor. Chiu et al. [6] abstracted a P2P system as a static star topology, and claimed that coding does not increase the network capacity compared with routing. Through mean-field analysis of a dynamic P2P system, Niu and Li [1] claimed that network coding can alleviate the imbalance of block distributions in traditional content distribution protocols, thereby improving the resilience to network dynamics. Both analytical works, as well as the existing system implementations, have relied on the premise of cooperative peers, while measurement of real P2P systems exhibits a dominant portion of selfish free riders [3] , [7] . In this paper, we aim at quantifying the fundamental advantages of network coding in such noncooperative environment.
Our work is partly inspired by Osborne and Rubinstein [8] , who analyzed the impact of strategic price settings on the equilibrium of a market economy. Traditional market economy has assumed agents leaving the market after a successful transaction, with the buyer owning the goods while the seller earning the payment. In contrast, P2P systems feature copiable and resalable products that propagate their values over time, thus requiring the support of a brand new model.
Game theoretic analysis of peer behaviors has been widely employed (see [3] for a survey). This line of research focused on designing incentives to encourage cooperation. For instance, mechanism design can provide strong incentive for rational peers and lead them toward a socially optimal point, but it requires the support of trusted servers. Virtual payment mechanisms allow peer to trade directly via virtual money; hence, it is more amenable for implementation, and has been proposed in commercial P2P systems [9] . In this paper, however, we are less concerned with designing such incentive protocols, and instead, more focused on the equilibrium analysis assuming a virtual payment scheme is available. Our work differs from existing game theoretical framework not only in an emphasis on network coding, but also in its equilibrium analysis under a decentralized market setting. We consider not just the strategic behavior of individual peers, but also how their self-interested pricing strategies affect the P2P market as a whole.
Economic models, in particular the market models for P2P systems have been explored by the MMAPPS project [10] , which proposed market management techniques to encourage cooperation. Within MMAPPS, Courcoubetis and Weber [11] developed a theoretical framework that abstracted the shared content as public goods. However, the mechanism lacks a support for network dynamics and a concrete modeling of the peers' valuations of goods. The economic implication of network coding has been discussed in recent work [12] , yet focusing on centralized cellular networks with price-taking agents. To our knowledge, there does not exist any previous work on the power of network coding in a P2P content distribution market with strategical participants. Our work is also the first that establishes a decentralized resale market model to analyze the equilibrium of P2P systems, and can be generalized to other markets consisting of resalable digital information goods.
CODING-BASED P2P CONTENT DISTRIBUTION MARKET
In this section, we introduce the widely used segmentbased network coding protocol for P2P content distribution. When running such a protocol, peers purchase and resell the coded data blocks, thereby forming a content distribution market. We specify the various elements of such a P2P market economy, including the classification of peers and the formation of price.
P2P Content Distribution via Network Coding
Existing coding-based P2P content distribution protocols have mostly adopted the following segment-based scheme. Before transmission, the original data file is grouped into segments, each containing K blocks of size E bytes. K and E are termed segment size and block size, respectively. The coding operations are performed within each segment. We represent each segment as a matrix B, a K Â E matrix, with rows being the K blocks, and columns the bytes (integers from 0 to 255) of each block. The encoding operation produces a linear combination of the original blocks in this segment by X ¼ R Á B, where R is a K Â K matrix composed of random coefficients in the Galois field GF ð2 8 Þ. The coded blocks (rows in X), together with the coding coefficients (rows in R), are packetized and delivered to other peers.
The decoding operation at each peer is the matrix inversion B ¼ R À1 Á X, where each row of X represents a coded block and each row of R represents the coding coefficients accomplished with it. The successful recovery of the original segment B requires that the matrix R be of full rank, i.e., each peer must collect K independent coded blocks for this segment. However, a peer can upload coded blocks even if the segment is not ready to decode yet. It produces a new block by re-encoding existing blocks it has collected in this segment. The re-encoding operation replaces the coding coefficients accomplished with the original coded packets with another set of random coefficients. For instance, consider the existing coded packets as rows in the matrix Y , which from the viewpoint of the source were obtained using Y ¼ R y Á B (B is the original uncoded packets and R y are the random coefficients). Then, the current holder may produce a new code block by reencoding existing packets as
As a result, the original coefficients R y are replaced by R 0 y . The re-encoding operation circumvents the block-level scheduling problem in traditional content distribution protocols, because by randomly mixing information from all existing blocks, a newly generated coded block is innovative to the downstream peer with high probability [1] .
Although randomized network coding solves the block selection problem within a segment, a scheduling algorithm is still needed to decide which segment to upload or download. We assume each peer adopts a push-based random scheduling protocol, which randomly selects a segment, generates a coded block, and then uploads it to his partner. This assumption does not limit the generality of our major analysis, as our game theoretical models conclude with pricing strategies that adapt to general scheduling policies.
Note that traditional noncoding scheme can be considered as a special case of segment-based network coding where K ¼ 1, i.e., each segment has a single data block. By contrast, the Avalanche [2] protocol corresponds to the other polar, i.e., the full-coding case, where the entire file is encoded into a single segment. Also note that simply segmenting the whole file without encoding (i.e., information mixing) does not bring any coding advantage, because the blocks within each segment are still sequenced and scheduled separately.
The Decentralized Market
We focus on a P2P market place where peers act as the agents who purchase and sell data blocks (goods). Peers can directly trade with each other through a virtual currency, such as the lightweight currency in [13] . Such a currency is not tied to real-world money, but can still reflect peers' valuation of the goods. Just as the currency in real markets, a virtual currency can incentivize the transaction between peers, thereby enhancing the resource sharing in P2P networks. Real P2P systems, such as Kazaa, have already used such virtual currency as implicit incentives [13] .
In such a P2P market, agents can set the price of data blocks via bargaining. Whenever a buyer and a seller meet, they initiate a pairwise bargaining process over the data of mutual interest. If both peers agree upon a certain price, then the seller uploads a data block, and the buyer will pay the money in return. An agent may act as a seller and buyer simultaneously, resulting in an exchange transaction. If on the other hand the negotiation ends with a disagreement, then both peers have to switch to alternative partners.
We assume network coding is performed over a file shared among peers. The file consists of F blocks and is grouped into M segments, i.e., the segment size K ¼ F M . Since all data blocks within each segment are equally useful to the buyers, each segment corresponds to one type of good, i.e., the total types of goods circulating in the market equal M. Fig. 1 illustrates a typical transaction between two peers, which randomly selects a good for bargaining after meeting each other. Without loss of generality, we focus on pricing a single good. We classify the market agents into ðK þ 1Þ types. A type-i agent (0 i K) possesses a total number of i coded blocks of the good. Hence, A type-0 agent can only purchase goods, while a type-K agent who has fulfilled the segment only sells goods to others.
As in a real-world market, the outcome of any pairwise bargaining depends on the current market condition, i.e., the availability of the goods. If a good is abundant in the market, the buyer can easily find an alternative seller, and the buyer may be better-off searching for alternative providers if the price proposed by the current seller is too high. Conversely, scarce goods will be charged higher prices than abundant ones. Similar to a real-world market with material goods, as the P2P market evolves, we can expect that an equilibrium exists that specifies a stationary per-block price for each good. Once the market evolves to a steady state, all peers agree upon a common set of prices and no actual negotiation takes place. We will formalize the equilibrium point in the following section.
BARGAINING GAME IN THE MARKET
In this section, we describe the elemental transaction procedure on the P2P market, i.e., the pairwise bargaining game. We first characterize the equilibrium pricing strategies of agents, and then prove that such individual transaction behaviors result in a globally stable market.
The Rules of Bargaining
We model the P2P market as a discrete time system. The duration of a period equals the time needed to transmit a single block. To capture the market dynamics, we assume an agent is impatient, remaining in the market in each period with probability , i.e., the churn rate (peer join and departure rate) ¼ 1 À . Agents have homogeneous upload and download bandwidth, which equals one block per period. We abstract the peer selection as a matching process in which an agent is randomly matched to another agent in each period. Upon matching, the pair of agents selects one good of mutual interest and propose to exchange one block of the good. We restrict the exchange of blocks within the same good because different goods may have different availability and distinct prices. The outcome of the exchange depends on two factors: the usefulness of the block, and the bargaining result.
Before the transaction, both agents need to make sure they can provide at least one useful block to each other. This can be trivially satisfied if they are of type i and j, respectively, where 0 < i; j < K. If one of them is of type 0 or K, then the transaction becomes a unilateral sale, instead of bilateral exchange. Remarkably, even in a unilateral sale, the bandwidth is not wasted because two goods may be simultaneously under transaction.
The second and most critical factor in the transaction is whether the bargaining between the pair of agents results in an agreement. Since the agents may have different valuations of the good, the one who gains more has to pay for the other. To avoid unfair advantages of the initiator, we dictate that one agent (referred to as proposer) is randomly selected to propose a price for the exchange. The opposite agent (referred to as responder) responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposal. In the case of rejection, both agents continue to the next period, looking for new partners. The ability to switch to alternative partners enhances the agents' bargaining power, since they can threat to abandon the current partner, thus making it a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer. Therefore, whether the bargaining results in agreement or disagreement depends on the availability of the good on the market.
As the market evolves to a steady state, each type of agents adopts stationary strategies, similar to a real market economy [8] . To be specific, a stationary strategy implies that each type of proposer or responder maintains the same reservation prices when facing the same type of partners. The reservation prices of a type-i agent include a proposer price p Ã ij , the optimal price he can bid that is acceptable to a type-j agent; and a responder price q Ã ij , the optimal price that is proposed by his partner j and is acceptable to him. For consistency, the subscript ij always indicates the price that i should pay to j, and therefore p ij ¼ Àq ji and q ij ¼ Àp ji . With stationary strategies, whenever an agent i is matched to agent j, he proposes p Ã ij to agent j if he is selected as the proposer; and he accepts a proposal q ij from j if and only if q ij q Ã ij . In what follows, we characterize the reservation prices p Ã ij and q Ã ij corresponding to the unique stationary strategy that satisfies subgame perfectness. We further justify that it is not profitable for an agent to use nonstationary strategies at equilibrium.
The Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in Pairwise Transactions
The classic concept of Nash equilibrium in game theory characterizes the strategy profiles in which no players can profit more by unilaterally deviating from his current strategy. However, Nash equilibrium strategies may include incredible threats, which the threatener himself does not prefer to issue, but which may still deter the actions of the one under threat. In the above bargaining game, the strategy of a type-i agent with p ij < 0 and q ij > 1 constitutes a Nash equilibrium, since every agent receives payoff 0 and no one can profit more than 0 by changing his own strategy. However, threatening to resort to such strategies is incredible since the agents are aware that any alternatives with 0 < p ij < 1 and 0 < q ij < 1 can be more beneficial. The notion of Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium [14] refines Nash equilibrium by ruling out such incredible threats. Specifically, a subgame in the above bargaining is a game starting from an arbitrary proposer and lasts one time slot, ending up with either a disagreement or a successful transaction. The strategy for an agent i is the pricing proposal p ij and a response to proposed price q ij , both relating to his partner j. The payoff in each single transaction equals the utility minus cost. More precisely, for a transaction between proposer i and responder j, the payoff equals S ij À p ij for agent i and T ij þ p ij for agent j. We use S ij to denote the utility of the proposer i, which equals to the number of blocks (either 0 or 1) i downloads from j in the transaction. Similarly, T ij is the number of blocks the responder j downloads from i. Here, the p ij is not the actual monetary value of a block. Instead, it represents a virtual currency that maps the monetary value to the usefulness of a block. Alternatively, we can define the utility to be a function of S ij that translates the number of purchased blocks into the corresponding monetary value. The equilibrium price may be different for different definitions, but it does not affect the market's trends, e.g., the relation between equilibrium price and market stability (churn rate).
Given the above elements of the game, a strategy profile constitutes a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. For each subgame, the expected payoff depends not only on the payoff in a single transaction, but also potential payoff he can gain by reselling the blocks he gets, and the possibility of switching to alternative partners. In what follows, we establish the necessary condition and sufficient condition for a stationary SPNE strategy in Lemmas 1 and 2, respectively. We summarize the results concerning the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE in Theorem 1. Lemma 1. Any stationary SPNE strategy must satisfy:
À0 ; i is the probability to meet a type-i agent. (2) is an SPNE strategy for every pairwise bargaining game.
Proof. See Appendix B, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library. t u Lemma 1 establishes that (1) and (2) are the necessary conditions for an SPNE strategy, while Lemma 2 justifies the sufficiency of the condition. Since the systems of equations corresponding to the condition have a unique solution, we have the following result: Theorem 1. The unique stationary subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium strategy is the threshold-based strategy with reservation prices defined in (1) and (2).
From (1) and (2), we conclude that the SPNE price depends on the coding complexity (reflected in K), availability of the good (reflected in i ), as well as the degree of market dynamics (reflected in ). The intricate relations will be further clarified in Section 5.
The analyses above have centered around the strategically stable configurations. In Appendix C, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library, we further extend the equilibrium to a temporally stable setting, proving that it is insensitive to strategical manipulations of any individual agent over time.
THE EQUILIBRIUM PRICE AND PAYOFF
In this section, we analyze the steady-state distribution of goods availability in the coding-based P2P market, and then integrate it with the previous game theoretic analysis. This leads us to a comprehensive understanding of the relation between the scarcity of goods and the equilibrium price, and the market power of network coding in this context.
Availability of Goods at Steady State
We consider a discrete time Markov chain model describing agents' behavior in the market. Without loss of generality, we focus on the availability evolution of one good. Similar to the model in deriving Theorem 2, the number of blocks an agent holds represents his state. The state space also includes "leave" where this agent departs. A direct calculation for the evolution of the Markov chain is intractable since it involves a state space of size N Kþ2 . Hence, we seek for a deterministic approximation to the evolution of the market using differential equations.
We focus on a steady state of the peer population, in which the total number of agents N is large and remains roughly constant. Assume the peers join and depart the market following a Poisson process, then the arrival rate equals the departure rate, and corresponds to the departing probability in the game model. Suppose the goods (segments) are randomly selected for downloading upon the encounter of two agents. Then, one could expect that each good experiences a similar level of availability. These modeling assumptions will be justified using simulations.
Denote n i as the number of agents holding exactly i blocks. Consider the evolution of the market during a short period Át. The increase of n i within Át equals the number of peers each holding at least ði À 1Þ blocks, and downloading one more block. The probability that such a peer is chosen equals n i N , while the probability that a segment (good) i is chosen equals 1 M when using the random scheduling policy. Note that only ðN À n 0 Þ peers have nonzero blocks and can provide this good for others. The total increase of n i thus equals:
The decrease of n i happens in two cases. First, a peer holding i blocks departs, and is subsequently replaced by a new peer with zero block. The total number of such peers equals Nt Á n i N , which is the total number of departing peers times the probability that a random peer is of type i. Second, a peer holding i blocks downloads one more block and subsequently becomes type-ði þ 1Þ. Similar to the above analysis for type-ði À 1Þ. The total number of such peers equals ÁtðN À n 0 Þ n iÀ1 NM . Then, the evolution of n i in Át is
For those peers having zero blocks, the total number of increase in population equals the number of departing peers holding nonzero blocks which are subsequently replaced by type-0 peers. The total decrease equals the number of type-0 peers who download one more block. Therefore, the evolution of type-0 population is
As Át ! 0, the following system of differential equations captures the evolution of the market:
Solving for the steady state, and let ¼ n 0 NÀn 0 , we have
The above result also applies for a difference equation with Át ¼ 1 and t ! 1. In Appendix D, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library, we establish that this deterministic differential/difference equation model indeed converges to the Markov chain representing the system states.
Our detailed simulation results in Appendix E, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library, justify that the mean-field model can accurately capture the availability of goods. In addition, we show that the market agents can accurately estimate the global availability of goods by inspecting local information within the neighborhood. Hence, the bargaining game can be realized in a decentralized manner. Appendix E, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library, also includes the corresponding model for the case with content servers.
Equilibrium Properties of the Market
We proceed to integrate the SPNE and market equilibrium analysis in Section 4 with the steady-state model. Our emphasis is on how network coding affects the equilibrium properties of the market. We use asymptotic approximations to derive theoretical insights, and use exact numerical simulations to crystalize such effects. We focus on three metrics: entry price, lifetime payoff, and seeder's payoff, which will be defined below. The former two metrics are closely related to agents' incentive to join in a market economy, while the latter is closely related to seeder's incentive to serve others after he obtains all the goods, and with the server's incentive to keep the market online.
Entry Price
When entering the market, an agent has no blocks to exchange with others, and thus must bring an initial capital that allows him to buy one block of a certain good. The amount of initial capital needed to start transacting a good is referred to as the entry price of that good. For the steadystate market with stationary strategies, the entry price equals maxfp 
To avoid more complex exposition, we mainly focus on the closed-form solutions to two extreme cases, namely, the noncoding and full-coding case. We evaluate the general partial coding cases through numerical simulation. For the noncoding case (K ¼ 1), the above can be reduced to:
. Considering the file size F ¼ M, and is usually very large, the entry price can be further reduced by ignoring the second order terms:
Therefore, for the noncoding case, when file size is fixed, entry price increases approximately linearly with the churn rate, namely, the impatience of agents.
For the full-coding case, the entire file is a single segment (i.e., M ¼ 1; K ¼ F ); hence,
When is close to 0, the above can be simplified to
When is large, we can obtain the Taylor series of V x at ¼ 1:
which is a decreasing function when approaches 1. Therefore, for full coding, the entry price has distinct properties in two regions roughly defined with respect to churn rate. In the low churn rate region ( close to 0), entry price increases with churn rate and decreases with file size. However, in the high churn rate region ( close to 1), file size is irrelevant, and entry price decreases with churn rate. We proceed to numerically justify these intuitions with more accuracy and for the partial coding case. Fig. 2 plots the curves derived directly from (7). As can be induced from the figure and the steady-state analysis, content distribution protocol is stable only if the churn rate is less than 1 M , otherwise the agents holding zero blocks will eventually dominate the market and the good will vanish. Therefore, under a fixed file size F (F ¼ 1;000 in all our numerical simulation), higher coding complexity (larger K) corresponds to smaller M, allowing for larger churn rate . This means that a P2P content distribution market is more tolerant to agents' impatience when using network coding, especially the full-coding protocol.
Since F ¼ M for the noncoding protocol, it is only stable for 2 ð0; 1 F Þ. In this region, the full-coding protocol has the lowest entry price, which increases as the coding complexity decreases, meaning that lower entry price is obtained at the cost of coding complexity. When is sufficiently large, using smaller segment size may result in lower entry price. This is because the resale value of goods is degraded in the high churn rate region. With smaller K, the resale value is shared by a larger number of goods; hence, the per-good value decreases, resulting in lower entry price. In the extreme case ¼ 1, a good has no resale value, and its entry price equals the utility value 1. We remark that a real-world P2P market tends to survive in the low churn rate region since the average peer lifetime is on the order of hours [7] .
Lifetime Payoff
We define lifetime payoff as an agent's expected payoff when he enters the steady-state market. Initially, an agent holds zero block; hence, his expected payoff for each good equals U 0 , and the lifetime payoff equals to MU 0 as M represents the total number of goods on sale.
From the equilibrium analysis established when proving Lemma 1, we have U 1 À U 0 ¼ V x and
where 0 ¼ n 0 NM ¼ . By solving these two equations, we obtain For the full-coding case (M ¼ 1), we have the following approximation:
For noncoding, we have
We conclude from (11) and (12) that the lifetime payoff monotonically decreases as churn rate increases from 0 to 1 M . The rate of decreasing is approximately linear for noncoding and approximately sublinear (for 0 < < 1) for full coding. Therefore, network coding can alleviate the market's instability facing churns, and can expand the region in which the agents have positive payoff and are motivated to join.
From the general cases plotted in Fig. 3 , we can see that higher coding complexity always induces higher level of payoff. For any configuration, payoff approaches 0 as churn rate approaches 1 M . As churn rate approaches 0, all configurations approach the highest possible payoff, which equals to the file size F . In summary, the advantages of network coding are best demonstrated in a dynamic market with impatient agents, and will diminish as the agents become more patient.
To clarify the trade-off between coding complexity and the lifetime payoff, we characterize their relations in Fig. 4 . In general, payoff increases with coding complexity, namely, the segment size K. However, the increase is negligible when K is beyond a small threshold that depends on churn rate. This implies that encoding a small number of blocks is sufficient to harvest the benefit of network coding.
The Seeder's Payoff
We refer to an agent who has collected all blocks of all goods as a seeder. At the moment an agent has fulfilled a good, his expected payoff during the residual lifetime is U K . Therefore, after he becomes a seeder, the expected payoff equals MU K .
From the proof of Lemma 1, we have
For noncoding, we have:
When file size is fixed, the seeder's payoff is approximately linearly increasing with churn rate. For the full-coding case, we can easily verify, following the approximations in the above sections, that the seeder's payoff demonstrates different characteristics depending on the churn rate. However, we only present the numerical results below.
From Fig. 5 , we observe that the seeder's payoff increases monotonically with churn rate in the low churn rate region. Lower coding complexity results in higher revenue for the seeders, but at the cost of a lower level of tolerance to churns. The intuition behind is that with low coding complexity, the agent's impatience problem becomes more threatening, thus a seeder who holds all the goods has higher bargaining power on the market, and thus harvests more advantage through the decentralized bargaining. In the high churn rate region, similar to entry price, seeder's payoff decreases due to the dominant decrease of resale value. Similar analysis can be observed for the case with content servers (see Appendix F for details, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework that quantifies the market power of network coding in a noncooperative P2P content distribution system. We model the network participants as market agents who purchase and resell goods (data segments), and strategically set prices according to availability of the goods. We then rigorously characterize the pricing strategies that constitute a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, as well as a market equilibrium which is proof against individual temporal deviations. Combined with a steady-state modeling of the goods availability, this analysis allows us to derive closedform solutions that capture the effects of network coding in a dynamic market. In particular, network coding improves the market's resilience to impatient agents, at the cost of high coding complexity. More importantly, it enhances the agents' incentive to join by lowering the entry price, and by increasing their expected payoff. Notably, such coding advantages diminish as the agents become more patient, i.e., when the market demonstrates lesser dynamics. We have focused on a steady-state market in which agents adopt stationary strategies. An interesting future avenue is to understand the transient properties of the market and implement distributed algorithms that lead the market to the stationary regime.
